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Chapter 7

A Discernible Impact?
The Influence of Public Opinion
on EU Policymaking During the
Sovereign Debt Crisis
Jennifer R. Wozniak Boyle and Chris Hasselmann

The European sovereign debt crisis provides an excellent opportunity for
examining the extent to which public preferences constrain member state
preferences for EU policy solutions. We examine the influence of public
opinion on austerity, spending, and regulation on member state preferences
on 4 major EU solutions to the crisis from 20I0-2011: the initial Greek financial rescue, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, the reform
of the Stability and Growth pact, and enhanced EU financial regulation.
Our analysis reveals that prior to elections and/or when there is a degree of
fragmentation in the governing party or coalition public opinion constrains
member state preferences. In the absence of these conditions, however, member states ignored public opinion and followed elite preferences concerning
solutions to the sovereign debt crisis.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
How, when, and to what extent does public opinion matter for EU policymaking? Two paradigms have been put forth to explain the role of public opinion
in European integration: Lindberg and Schiengold's " permissive consensus"
and Hooghe and Marks' "constraining dissensus." Lindberg and Scheingold's
(1970) contention that public opinion is not a significant explanatory factor in
European integration has been the dominant approach. This mode l maintains
that public opinion, while generally favorable toward European integration,
does not directly influence institutional or policy development in the EU.
According to this view, European governmental elites receive a permissive
123
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cons_ensu~ in favor ~f ~uropean i~tegration, and then determine the specific
details without pubhc mput, scrutmy or censorship. In accordance with thi
perspective, Sanders and Toka (2013) argue that EU heads of state ds
"ft uenced more by economic elites and by extrapolat'~
government are m
. .
ion
economic mterest groups than by public opinion. Sanders and Toka (201
3'
22) find that:
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Hooghe and Marks (2009) agree that the model of "permissive consensus"
successfully explained the role of public opinion in the European Union from
1957 through 1991. However, they contend that this was because Europe~
integration was primarily concerned with economic policy coordination
and did not directly impact the majority of Europeans. After 1991, however'
they maintain that the model of "constraining dissensus" best explains th~
relationship of public opinion and European integration. As the EU came to
enco~~ass !11onetary an~ political union, it "spilled beyond interest group
bargammg mto the pubhc sphere" (2009, 5). Public opinion on European
integration became more structured and salient in national politics due in
large part to national political parties assembling positions on EU institutions
and policies to suit their national electoral, governing, and policy objectives
~2009 13, 19). As a result of partisan calculations on economic and identity
issues, they contend the pro-integration elite has been constrained in pursuing increased integration by an increasingly Euroskeptical public (2009, 9).
Hooghe and Marks argue that "[m]ass politics trump interest group politics
when both come into play" (2009, 18). However, while interest groups will
always seek to influence European integration, public opinion must be mobilized by political parties. Hooghe and Marks maintain that political parties are
more likely to mobilize public opinion on an EU issue if their stance on the
issue fits with their ideological tradition, iftheir members are united on it, and
if they anticipate electoral success from their stance on the issue (2009, 19).

licymaking. The model of permissive consensus maintains member state
po ferences are not a function of public opinion but influenced predominantly
pre economic elites. Member state preferences on EU policies reflect elite
brlculations of the economic costs and benefits of specific EU measures.
~ember state preferences on proposed EU measures are expected to vary
ccording to whether a member state is an expected net contributor or net
~eneficiary of proposed EU funds_ and regulation_s. For exampl~, preferences
. net contributor states are predicted to be agamst EU spendmg measures
1
:d in favor of enhanced austerity and regulation; preferences in net recipient
atates are likely to be in favor of spending and against austerity and economic
;egulation. Member stat~ g~vernments may _def~ public opinion ~nd e_~brace
EU policies that contradict it when economic ehtes oppose pubhc opm10n.
Alternatively, according to the model of constraining dissensus, member
state preferences are influenced primarily by governing party ideology and
politics. Governing party ideologies vary from market liberalism on the right
to regulated capitalism on the left (see Hooghe and Marks 2009, 14-15).
Liberal and conservative governments should favor austerity and oppose
spending and regulation; and socialist governments should favor spending
and regulation as solutions to the debt crisis. Member state preferences will
be responsive to public opinion when it contradicts governing party ideology
prior to elections and during coalition governments.
In order to explore these models, we examine public opinion, elite
preferences and member state preferences in Germany, France, the UK,
Spain and Italy on ( 1) the Greek financial rescue; (2) the European Stability
Mechanism; (3) the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact; and (4) EU
regulations on the financial sectors. Public opinion on spending, austerity,
economic coordination and financial regulation is measured during Council
negotiations over the initiatives via Eurobarometer surveys. Elite preferences
include opinions of national economic and financial actors and are derived
from news reports. Member state preferences on the four EU initiatives
are ascertained from news reports and public documents concerning
Council meetings on the initiatives. Following Timus (2006) and Nguyen
(2008) we seek to understand the interaction of public, elite and member
state preferences. Comparing public, elite preferences and member state
preferences on major EU initiatives allows us to discern the conditions of
public influence on EU policymaking.

RESEARCH DESIGN

THE GREEK FINANCIAL RESCUE

The foregoing models lead to alternative predictions about the relative
influence of public and elite opinion on member state preferences in EU

The debt crisis became apparent in the fall of 2009 when Greece announced
that its budget deficit was 12.7 percent-more than twice what it had previously

[P]olitical elites' primary sources of opinion cues are not their respective mass
pu~lics but their respective national economic elites. In sum, in determining
their own stances towards the EU, political elites appear to place more weight
on the views of the economically rich and powerful than they do on the views of
their own constituents. They respond to mass opinion, but not as much as they
respond to other national elites.
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reported and more than four times the prescribed EU limit (Agence France
Press, January 24, 20 I 0). The Greek announcement presented an immediate
threat not only to the solvency of the Greek government and the people of
Greece, but to Greece's creditors and the stability of the euro. The Greek
announcement also revealed the weaknesses of the economic coordinatio
between the euro economies, in particular the lax monitoring and enforce~
ment of the convergence criteria and the stability and growth pact. In shon
the Greek debt crisis ushered in what has since been termed "the euro crisis.';
Member state and Commission solutions for the Greek debt crisis included
spending and austerity measures to address the Greek budget imbalance and
economic and financial regulation to prevent the reoccurrence of similar
crises. Given the sensitivity surrounding such solutions, one might expect the
Commission to probe public sentiments in its crisis-specific Eurobarometer
surveys. However, no such question was included prior to the adoption of
the first Greek financial rescue. Fortunately, the Financial Times was less
inhibited. In its March 2010 survey of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and
the UK respondents were queried on the use of public money to rescue cashstrapped members.
The results in Table 7.1 follow expectations as countries can be divided in
two groups based on whether they were likely to be a provider (Germany, the
UK, and France) or a possible recipient of such funds (Italy and Spain). 1 First
while there was solidarity in general, in that the EU and its members wer~
seen as having a responsibility to help me mbers that encounter financial and/
or fiscal trouble, there was considerably less solidarity when it came to helping
the Greeks in particular. In the latter case, there was particular opposition to
be found in the UK (56% opposed) and in Germany (61 % opposed). French
public opinion was nearly evenly split on the question of EU help for Greece
with 40 percent supportive and 39 percent opposed. Second, there was little
interest in guaranteeing the debts of another EU member; over 60 percent of
the respondents in France, the UK, and Germany were opposed to a measure
that would have placed them at ri sk of paying off the debts of other members.
In short, there appear to be limits to EU financial solidarity, especially if
defined as taking on the obligations of another country's deficit spending.
Third, in more positive news, there was also little interest in requesting
Greece to leave the Eurozone while it sorted out its problems. While such
a "Grexit" was a widely discussed option at the time (spring of 2010), it
was not widely seen as desirable. Finally, and somewhat disconcertingly for
Brussels, a plurality of Germans (40%) believed their country would be better
off if it left the Eurozone. In the other 4 Eurozone countries, the plurality felt
their country would actually be worse off in leavi ng the Eurozone.
These attitudes are reflected in member state preferences at the onset
of the crisis. Germany and France- who held substantial percentages of
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Public Support for EU Financial Assistance to Greece
Germany The UK France Italy Spain

The EU & its members have a
responsibi lity to help other
members in financ ial/fiscal troubl e
support EU efforts to help Greece
cope with its budget def1c1t
Your government should guarantee
the debts of another EU member
Greece should be asked to leave
the eurozo ne while it sorts out its

Agree
Disagree

32°,\,
46

34
35

46
24

59
17

65
20

Support
Oppose
Support
Oppose
Agree
Disagree

20
61
76
32
40

25
56
15
61
27
32

40
39
16
60
19
55

44
33
26
44
20
53

60
34
30
44
23
50

finances
would your country be better or
worse off if it left the eu rozone?

Better
Worse

40
30

26
39

25
47

31
39

8

Source: financial Times, 2010.

Greek sovereign debt and were the likely largest contributors to a Eurozone
rescue-preferred Greek budget austerity and not a financial rescue (Barber,
Wiesmann and Hall 2010). Germany 's initial response to the crisis was to
insist Greece stabilize its budget by cutting expenditures (Agence France
Presse 20 lOa; Tilford 2010). Germany rejected calls for an EU or IMF
rescue package for Greece, arguing that the EU was prohibited from granting
financial bailouts to Eurozone states and that IMF involvement would
compromise the European Central Bank (ECB) and thereby EU sovereignty
(Barber 20 lOa; Peel 20 1Oa). France recommended austerity and initially
opposed an EU and/or IMF bailout (Barber and Hall 2010; Barber et al 2010;
Barber 20 I 0). The ECB also opposed EU and/or IMF bailouts and favored
Greek budgetary austerity (Atkins 20 lOa; Atkins et al. 2010). Spain, Italy
and the Commission supported a financial rescue of Greece (Agence France
Presse, 20 10d).
As sovereign default became an increasingly likely possibility for Greece,
France and Germany came under increasing domestic and international
pressure to support a financial rescue of Greece. Despite lukewarm public
support for EU assistance to Greece and opposition to securing Greek
debt, French President Sarkozy came to embrace an EU bailout of Greece.
His reversal- which contradicted French public opinion and his partisan
ideology- was in line with French economic elites and interests. French banks
held $67 billion in Greek debt- the largest percentage of any me mber state
(Ewing 20 10). BNP Paribas and Societe Generale had among the largest
exposures of any bank. French bankers, while sanguine in public statements,
were supportive of the Greek bailout to avoid immediate losses and possible
contagion to other member states (Fuhhrmans and Moffett 2010). Sarkozy not
only endorsed an EU-led rescue but sought to convince German Chancellor
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. he crisis. In general, public opinion set the bro~d contours of
bandhng of t
1· pre"erences and affected the timing ot the deal. The
. state po icy
l'
,
.
G
rnernbe1
. bl .
. .
eli'te and member state preferences m ermany
.
d
· ot pu ic op1mon,
interaction
that when public opinion competes with_ mterest group an
dernons~rate~
. .
.t has more sway prior to elections and more sway
onuc eltte op11110n, I
ec_on ·pect to coalition governments.
with res

Merkel of the necessity (Thomson 20 I Oa; 20 IOb ). Merkel was initiaU
opposed to an EU bailout. Her position was in line with public opinion an~
her FDP coalition partners against an EU bailout (Barber and Wiesman 2010).
Merkel was reported to be persuaded that an EU bailout would not survive the
German Constitutional Court (Peel and Tait 2010). Additionally, her position
was likely constrained by her need to secure a CDU-FDP victory in the
pending North Rhine-Westphalia elections in order to maintain a majority in
the Bundesrat (Peel 20 IOc). She, however, faced pressure for a bailout from
German economic elites and interests. Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank
officials warned of the contagion effects of a Greek default (Barber 20IOc·
Barber, Wiesman and Hall 2010). Finance minister, Wolfgang Schauble, als~
supported an EU bailout of Greece (Economist Intelligence Unit 2010).
Ultimately, Merkel conceded to a Greek rescue package tied to austerity
involving both the EU and the IMF. Greece would receive € 110 billion in
loans over three years (€80 billion from Eurozone states and €30 billion from
the IMF) in exchange for fiscal consolidation including increased sales taxes,
and cuts in government salaries and pensions to bring the government deficit
down to less than 3 percent GDP by 2012 (European Commission, Occasional
Papers no. 61 ). The EU portion of the bailout would be disbursed in the fonn of
bilateral loans from Eurozone states proportionate to their ECB contributions
contingent upon Commission and ECB assessment of conditionality and by
unanimous agreement of Eurozone states (European Council, 2010c).
An examination of public, elite and member state preferences surrounding
the Greek financial rescue reveals that in 3 of the 5 countries, public opinion
and member state preferences were aligned in the direction predicted
by economic cost/benefit considerations. Public, elite and member state
preferences in Spain and Italy were aligned and supportive of the bailout.
Public, elite and member state preferences in the UK were aligned and
opposed. While public opinion in France and Germany was opposed to the
bailout, member state preferences ultimately reflected elite calculations that
the costs of refusing a rescue were too high. Public opinion against an EU
bailout in Germany and lukewarm support in France did not prevent member
states from adopting one. While Gennan public opinion was ultimately
overruled, it definitely influenced the content of the final rescue package.
Reflecting German public sentiments, Germany secured increased fiscal
austerity for Greece and a veto over temporary , intergovernmental Eurozone
funding. Greece did not receive "free money" but rather loans tied to strict
conditionality and austerity. German public opinion also influenced the timing
of the Greek bailout. Merkel maintained opposition to the agreement until as
close to the North Rhine-Westphalia state election on May 9th as possible.
The election would not only decide her party's strength in the Bundesrat,
but was also a precursor to the next national election and referendum on her

THE EUROPEAN ST ABILITY MECHANISM
. . .
the Greek rescue were complicated by the fact that the
Negotiations over
. .
h· . m for coming to the aid of a Eurozone
. .
.d t have an ex1st111g mec ams
EU d1 ~o
.
financial difficulties. The Treaty on the Functwnmg
rnembe1 state fac~:7an explicitly prohibited the ECB (Article 123) and EU
of t~e ~urop(~~icle 125) from financially assisting Eurozone member states
instttut1ons
.
H wever some analy sts argued that the EU could
. budget constramts. o
b
t te
factng
A . l 122 2 which states that when a mem er s a
rescue
based
on
rtlc
e
.
d."
,
moun t .a
. h severe difficulties caused by natural isasters
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,
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Table 7.2
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Public Support for EU Financial Assistance for all EU Member States

Source: European Commission 2013a, QCl 0.

Table 7.3

Public Support for Deficit Reduction v. Job Creation

Less than
In an international financial and
economic crisis, it is necessary
to increase public deficits to
create jobs.

40% Agree

Between 40-60%
Agree

Germany
France

Italy
Spa in

More than
60% Agree

UK

Source: European Commission 2014, QC6.

respondents were largely unwilling to take on additional debt in the nam
At the other extreme, more than 60 percent of
m the UK supported deficit spending to create jobs. In Italy and Spain,
~0-60 percent of the p~pulation was willing to increase their country's
indebtedness to promote JOb creation. It is essential not to read support of a
national stimulus approaches to national economic woes as translating into
support for EU-wide Keynesian policies. However, it is reasonable to assume
that France and German publics who opposed such policies in their own
countries would oppose them for the EU in general.
Germany had first proposed a permanent EU bailout mechanism, the
European Monetary Fund (EMF), in spring 2010 (Peel, Hall and Barber
2010). The German proposal, which would require treaty revision, was
to give the EU an IMF-like institution that granted loans upon strict
conditionality to any Eurozone state experiencing financial and economic
imbalances (Agence Europe 20 l Od). The EMF proposal was Merkel's
attempt to reconcile increased pressure from German economic elites,
France, and the Commission for a financial rescue of Greece with Gennan
public opinion preferences for budget stabilization and austerity, ensure that
rescue conform to TEU require me nts, and pass muster with the Gennan
Constitutional Court. While the German suggestion was weakly endorsed by
the Commission and France, both were ske ptical of pursuing treaty revisions
(Peel, Hall and Barber 20 I 0). A !though me mber state preferences were not
emphatically opposed to the EMF proposal, the latter was tabled in favor of
a temporary, largely intergovernme ntal €750 billion Eurozone stabilization

?f job creation.

responden~
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to concerns that a permanent E U fund would require amending
kage d ue
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.
.
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201 Od) .hanae to bring forth the permanent EU rescue fund by conced"mg t he
treaty c
e
.
.
.
.
f'
. 1·· .
ma nd for addino automatic nanonal penalties or states v10 atmg
German de
e
I
set in a new Stability and Growth pact (Chaffin, Hall and Pee
targets
· ·
bl. I
d
oa). Despite the Franco-German deal, the Co~1_m1 ss1~n pu _ic_y o.pp~s~
201
·s·ion (Aaence France Press 20 !Oe). Bnt1sh Pnme M1mste1 David
0
·
rreaty revi
Cameron also opposed treaty change for a new permanent fund, an_d was m
otal budget freeze (Thomson 2010c). Merkel agreed to support a
favor o fa t
.
limit on EU budget growth in excha_nge f~r. the U~ supportmg tr~aty ch~ng~
(Wiesmann and Barker 20 10). Whtie w1llm~ t_o forgo automa~1c sanctions
for undisciplined spending, Merkel was un wtll_m g to com~rom1se on treaty
· ·on as a prerequis ite for a permanent funding mechamsm (Peel 20 I Oe ).
reVlSI
.
b ·1
Undoubtedly, the threat that Germany might not agree to future ai outs
without the treaty change convinced the majority of member states to agree
to the permane nt bailout fund via a minor treaty rev isio~ . Furthermore, the
possibility of utilizing an abridged pro~~dure of _unanimous approval by
European Council for minor treaty revisions, which was allowed by the
Lisbon Treaty, like ly convinced reluctant member states th~t they_ could
avoid the time-consuming-and ultimately risky-process 111volv1ng an
intergovernme ntal conference followed by national referend ums (Phillips
20 10).
.
The European Council agreed to create a new permanent resc ue fund, the_
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), to guarantee financial s~lvency of
euro member states by following the abbreviated procedure for mmor treaty
changes (European Council 20 10a). The ESM would be an intergo:ernm_e n~al
organization able to grant loans to Eurozone states o n the basis of unan~m1ty
and conditionality, including " hairc uts" for private bondholders (1b1d).
Discussions over the lending capacity of the fund were settled relatively
quickly, with Ge rmany, the Netherlands and F inland conceding to a €500
billion lending capacity of the fund (Spiegel and Pigna! 201 1). . Whtie
Germany conceded on the size of the fund , it successfully negotiated a
lower annual contribution over a 5-year period (Agence Europe 2011 b).
Gennany also conceded with respect to financial instruments of the fund .
While France was in favor of the ESM being able to buy government bonds
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and engage in bond swaps, Germany and the ECB were less enthusiastic
this item (Hollinger and Spiegel 2011; Weber 2011). Ultimately, Genna~n
agreed to allow the ESM to buy government bonds from member states a ~
on secondary markets (Spiegel 2011 b; Reuters 2011 ). Despite the rninn
.
~
concessions, Merkel successfully accommodated the German public's desfo
for fiscal discipline, the German Constitutional Court's requirement of E~
treaty revision. and the need to stabilize the euro and prevent the spread of
sovereign debt crisis.
The creation of the ESM indicates an approximate alignment of public
elite and member state preferences in favor of an EU fund to assist membe;
states facing economic and financial crises. Preferences ultimately reflected
~he calculation that the ~osts of failing to create a fund to address budgetary
unbalances and fiscal cnses across EU member states and stabilize the euro
were too high. The ESM was to involve strict conditionality and was not a
stimulus package. Therefore, it did not contradict French and German public
opinion against stimulus spending. Most importantly, German public opinion
on financial assistance for member states had evolved. While in March 2010
only 32 percent had supported "EU efforts to help member states in financiaV
fiscal trouble" (Table 7.1 ), by September 2010, 45.96 percent were supportive
of EU financial assistance (Table 7.2). Prior to the Greek bailout, the German
public did not support EU financial assistance. While Chancellor Merkel
dropped her EMF proposal in spring 20 l 0, she acceded to German financial
and banking interests to agree to a Greek bailout against public preferences.
Merkel was constrained by public opinion on the Greek rescue in spring
2010; but by the fall of 2010 German public opinion had come closer to the
preferences of German economic elites.

REFORMING THE ST ABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
While recipients of bailout funds could have austerity forced upon them as
a condition of receiving aid , the question remained how best to regulate the
behavior of all Eurozone members to avoid a repeat of the crisis in the future.
This need to regulate state behavior had been the logic behind the first Stability and Growth Pact introduced alongside the euro in 1999. The failings
of this first pact are well known and not addressed here ; however, following
the creation of the ESM, attention swung back to how best to regulate state
behavior. In fact, the paucity of rules governing member state economic and
financial policies, the weaknesses of EU supervisory and enforcement powers, and the lack of member state compliance with the Stability and Growth
Pact were widely seen as having contributed to the crisis (Barber 2009;
2010a; Agence Europe 2010b; Nelson et al. 2010).
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Table 7.4

France
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Italy
Spain

UK
EU Average
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oordination and governance procedures, the six-pack reform of the Stability
Growth pact was definitely less comprehensive and less forceful than
Gennany would have liked.
.
Having achieved a significant but not dramatic increase in economic
governance via the six-pack reg:ilat~ons, Germany and .F'.·ance propo~~d a
more ambitious set of fiscal coordination measures known 1mtially as the pact
for competitiveness" for the Eurozone countries (Peel 2011 ). The proposal
included recommendations for member states to coordinate wage and tax
policies, pension systems, and to adopt balanced budget legislati?1~s. ( ~ollinger
and Spiegel 2011 a). Initial responses to the Franco-German 1mtiat1ve were
negative: Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Poland were among
the states objecting to specific provisions and/or to the exclus10n of non-euro
member states (Hollinger and Spiegel 2011 b ). EU trade unions were also
repoited to be against the initiative (Agence Europe 20 I la). Com1:nission
President Barroso and European Council President Van Rompuy put torward
a sliahtly revised "pact for the euro" that retained most of the Franco-German
provisions but substituted Commission for member state overs.ight .(Spie~el
2011 a). Eurozone member states plus Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, L1thuama,
Poland and Romania agreed to the intergovernmental, non-binding euro
plus pact at the March 2011 European Council (European Council 20.1.1 ,
Annex I). Participating member states committed themselves to pursue specific
targets aimed at increasing competitiveness and promoting employ'.11~nt ,
fiscal discipline and the stability of financial institutions. The Comm1ss1on
would monitor and make recommendations for member state regulation and
compliance, but compliance would be wholly voluntary. While definitely an
expansion of the scope of economic coordination, since the pact did not include
any requirement of compliance, member states were not bound to implement
it. Given that Gem1any had fought for tough fiscal targets and sanctions for
violators in the six-pack negotiations, it is difficult to view the euro plus pact as
a clear, resounding victory for Ge1many. Nonetheless, recalling that Germany
conceded to a larger than desired ESM contribution (albeit over a longer time
period) at the very same summit that it won agreement to the euro plus pact
leads one to conclude that it exchanged greater EU spending on its part to secure
the promise of stricter fiscal discipline on the pait of other member states.
Public opinion and member state preferences are strikingly divergent on
the six-pack and euro plus pact reforms to the Stability and Growth pact in
all cases except Germany . In all member states public opinion favored tough
penalties for states failing to meet economic and fiscal targets. Despite public
support, France, Spain and Italy were initially opposed to tough, automatic
sanctions. Their preferences likely reflected economic analyses indicating
the likelihood of their accruing penalties. Only in Germany did the member
state preference reflect public sentiments. Yet, the German government

~nd

Public Support for Enhanced Economic Coordination
Strongly in Favor

Fairly in Favor

Fairly Opposed

Strongly Opposed

35.1 %
42.1
25.0
40.1
22 .9
32.1 5

46.1
34.4
61.0
41.6
44.7
45.85

13.5
16.8
11.4
11.6
20. 5
16.08

5.3
6.7
2.7
6.8
11.9
5.93

Source: European Commi ssion 201 J b, Q A 10_2.

likelihood, respondents were not imagining that penalties would accrue to
their own countries, but apply to the Greeks.
The Commission re-instigated discussion of reforming economic
governance and coordination by proposing six legislative proposals ("sixpack" ) aimed at augmenting the scope and enforcement of the Stability and
Growth Pact targets. The legislation would subject Eurozone member states
to near-automatic fines for not meeting debt, deficit and competitiveness
targets (European Commission 20 I Ob). Member states were divided into
two camps on the Commission proposals. Germany and the UK (joined
by the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland) argued that the Commission's
proposed sanctions were too soft and needed to be more aggressive and more
automatic (Spiegel 3010; Peel, Parker, Chaffin and Hall 20 IO; Chaffin and
Spiegel 20 I 0). The European Central Bank also favored tougher sanctions,
as did the European Parliament (Chaffin, Peel and Wilson 20 I 0, Agence
Europe 20 I Og). France, Italy, Spain and Belgium were opposed to automatic
sanctions (Chaffin, Peel and Wi Ison 20 l 0).
Significant progress on the Commission proposals was made when Germany
agreed to drop its insistence that the legislative proposals contain automatic
sanctions in exchange for France supporting treaty revision to create the ESM
(Chaffin, Hall and Peel 20 I 0). The European Council endorsed the Commission's
proposal for near-automatic sanctions (Agence Europe 20 I Oh). Member states
haggled over the details of the fiscal targets and enforcement mechanisms for
another full year until finally adopting the Commission proposals in November
2011 (Agence Europe 20 I le). The new proposals kept the Stability and Growth
Pact national deficit limit of 3 percent GDP and debt limit of 60 percent GDP
but enhanced monitoring and surveillance mechanisms to prevent states from
breaching these limits and enhanced corrective mechanisms to encourage states
that had exceeded the limits to bring spending back in line. States agreed to
pace spending growth to GDP growth, and to allow the Commission to impose
fines of 0.2 percent GDP upon Eurozone members that did not bring their debt
and deficits back into conformity unless states agreed by qualified majority to
prevent the fines (Council 2011 ). While a definite enhancement of economic

135

Jennifer R. Wo ::.niak Bo1·/e and Chris Ha sse/111ann

A Discernible lrnpact ~

compromised on the size and enforcement of the targets and penalties
originally desired. Intergovernmental bargaining actually brought the EU
reforms on the Stability and Growth pact closer to average EU public opinion
on economic coordination.

and hedge funds in 2009. EU regul atory standards for hedge fund s were
aimed at improving their tran sparency (European Commission 2009f). The
commission proposed a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to identify
potential threats to the stability of the EU financial system; and a European
System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) for banking, insurance and pensions
industries (see European Commission 2009b-e). The ESFS would be made
up of ex isting national level supervisors working in conjunction with three
new agencies: European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and European Securities and
markets Authority (ESMA).
Negotiations over the creation of the European System of Financial
Supervi sion , including the European Systemic Risk Board and three European
Supervi sory Authorities for banking, in surance and pensions proceeded
quickly with the Council agreeing to significantly diluted Commission
proposals in December 2009 (Willis 2009). The European Parliament, which
shared legislative power with the Counci l, objected to the member states
giving-largely at the behest of the UK-national financial authorities veto
power over the European authorities (Willis 20 lOa). The European Parliament
largely conceded to the Council positi o n, approving the regulations despite
failin g to secure desired direct and independent enforcement authority for the
ESRB and ES As (Willis 201 Ob). Council negotiations over the hedge funds
directive did not begin until spring 20 I 0. Member states were in two camps.
The UK led the opposition to the proposed standards. The UK argued that the
regulations would disadvantage EU hedge funds in international competition
and make it more difficult for non-EU funds to do business in Europe thereby
putting a se rious damper on the industry in Europe (Financial Tim es 20 I Oa).
Joining the UK in opposition to the hedge funds directive were Austria,
Czech Republic, Ireland, Malta and Sweden (ibid). France and Germany both
supp011ed the hedge fund directive (Financial Times 2010b). In May of2010,
the Counci l of Mini sters approved the hedge fund directive, outvoting the UK
and other opponents in a qualified majority vote (Financial Tim es 20 I Ob).
Member state preferences and public opinion on EU Regulation of the
Financial Sector were aligned and favorable to enhanced EU regulation in
Germany, France, Italy and Spain. However, the UK government position was
not aligned with UK public opinion. Prime Minister Cameron's consistent
opposition to enhanced regulation defied UK public support for it. Negotiations
over the European System of Financial Supervision regulations and the hedge
funds directi ve followed similar trajectories. In both negotiations, the UK was
able to water down the Commission proposals to a greater extent than France,
Germany or the European Parliament initially desired. The question of why
member states agreed to less stlingent financial regulation when EU public
opinion was strongly in favor of regulation can be understood if one understands
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REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
The six-pack and the euro plus pact were focused on regulating the economic
and fiscal discipline of states. A second line of policy was squarely aimed
at regulating the behavior of private financial actors, who were widely seen
as having caused the crisis in the first place. Setting aside the assessment of
blame, much of 20I0-2011 was spent debating how best and how much to regulate the financial markets so that this kind of banking turned sovereign debt
crisis would never repeat itself. This kind of policy search is part and parcel of
any bailout effort due to the moral hazard created by the bailouts themselves.
As Table 7.5 makes clear, the public was quite adamant that the financial
sector be brought to task for its role in crisis. Almost any proposal to curb
the financial market was going to be embraced loudly and with considerable
shadenfreude. It is also clear that the British were essentially in lockstep with
their continental cousins. So while the Briti sh government remains the most
vocal critic of such measures, there is little evidence to suggest that the British
public shares its government's concerns. In fact, when it comes to regulating
wages in the financial sector, the British are more virulent supporters than the
EU as a whole (53.4% vs. 48.6% ).
The Commission initially recommended strengthening the regulation
and supervision of financial sectors including banking, insurance, pensions
Table 7.5

Public Support for Regulation of the Financial Industry

Tougher rules on tax avoidance and
tax havens
The introduction of a tax o n profits
made by banks
The introduction of tax o n financia l
transactions
The regulat ion of wages in the
fi nanc ial sector (i.e., trader's
bonuses)
In creas ing transpa rency of finan cial
markets

Strongly
in Favor'

Fa irly
in Favor

Fairly
Opposed

EU: 62 .5%
UK: 64.0
EU: 52.0
UK: 56. 3
EU: 33.1
UK: 23.2
EU: 48.6
UK: 53.4

30.5
29.2
35 .6
31.3
37 .8
36.0
39. 1
33.8

5.4
4 .5
9.0
8.5
20.2
25 .2
9 .2
8.7

1.6
2.3
3.4
4.0
8.9
15 .6
3.1
4.1

EU: 57.0
UK: 54.3

38.0
40.4

4.0
4 .1

1.0
1.2

Strongly
Opposed

'The percentage of responrlents across the EU , excl ud ing the U K, w ith the UK fig ures prov ided separately.
Source: European Commission , 20 14, QCS.
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public opinion as constraining but not determining member state preference
Heads of state and government in France and Germany had a "permissivs.
consensus" broadly in favor of enhanced regul ation , but they also neede~
to be accountable to the noisy and persistent lobbyists for the wealthy and
powerful financial industries. A watered-down set of regulations allowed them
to accommodate both public and elite opinion. The lack of impact of British
public opinion on the UK position is an example of public opinion losing to elite
interest. Despite be ing in a coalition government, Prime Minister Cameron was
not facing elections. Furthermore, Cameron wo uld be unlikely to face public
reprisal for defending UK financial and economic interests in Brussel s.

CONCLUSION
The foregoing exploration of public opinion and government preferences during EU negotiation s on the financial and sovereig n debt crisis has sought to
clarify the influe nce of public opinion on member state preferences and intergovernmental bargaining. We found that the " permi ssive consensus" granted
to heads of state or government specifies a general po li cy preference and sets
broad paramete rs within which they seek to stay. However, member states
must also be respon sive to economic elites and inte rests, which may have
demands that run counter to majority publi c opinion. In such instances, we
found that government preferences and intergovernmental agreements drifted
beyond the parameters predicted by majority public opinion. For example,
whi~e majority public opinion in Germany, France and the UK was more supportive of austerity over spending during the financial crisis, the EU utilized
both remedies in tandem, to bolster the banking and financial industries and
stabilize the euro. Similarly, with respect to inc reased fin ancial regulation, the
final EU reg ulation s were far less aggressive th an public opinion in Germany,
France and the UK would have predicted.

NOTE
I. It should be noted, however, that France is also considered among the group of
countries that mi ght, if things get bad enough , end up need ing assistance too. Forbes
has gone as far as to say that "fn fact, it's Fra nce-not Greece or Spain-that now
poses the greatest threat to the euro 's survi val" (Tully 20 13, I). A similar concern was
raised a year earlier by The Eco11omist (see Economist 20 12). So while the crisis was
primarily about Portugal, Ireland, and Greece (the PIGs) at the outset, and that Italy
and Spain were the two large countries seen most at ri sk of a contagion effect (making
it PTT GS), France has been seen as a distant and horrifying prospect given its debt and
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competive ness issues. It should also be noted that the French governmem rejects this
poi nt of view (see for example The Telegraph 20 12).
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